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ABSTRACT 
I analyse Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-brain identity theories. Specifically, he argues 
against the identity between pain and C-fibres simulation by pointing out the difference between this 
identity claim and the theoretical identifications, such as ‘Water is H2O’ and ‘Lightning is a motion of 
electric charges’. Kripke’s argument relies on the assumption that the experience of pains is a simple 
and homogenous phenomenon, but scientific research shows that it is in fact a quite complex one. We 
can distinguish at least three components: sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective and 
cognitive. This discovery makes it possible to reject Kripke’s argument, but it also uncovers a major 
flaw that is common to all modal arguments against physicalism. They proclaim to answer the 
fundamental question about the nature of our world by relying on our powers of imagination and 
without having the relevant factual knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modal arguments are quite common in philosophy. We often reason what is necessary, 
possible, or impossible. For instance, one famous example from the history of philosophy is 
Anselm’s argument for God’s existence. Anselm relies on two claims, first, God is a being 
than which a greater cannot be conceived, and second, necessary existence is perfection. 
Often in modal arguments it is also talked about what is conceivable, and conceivability is 
understood as a guide to possibility. An especially common strategy is to employ such 
arguments to establish claims of identity and distinctness. In this way Descartes argues for a 
dualistic solution of the mind-body problem. He argues that since he can clearly and 
distinctly conceive the mind as being apart from the body, mind and body are possibly 
distinct. However, possible distinctness implies actual distinctness since nothing can exist 
without itself. Descartes thus concludes that mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa) are 
two distinct entities and opts for substance dualism. 
The mind-body problem is certainly still with us, but while in Descartes’ times dualism was 
the prevalent view, today most philosophers defend the materialist or physicalist solution to 
the problem. However, it does not suffice to proclaim that the world is wholly physical – one 
must also explain how mental phenomena can be explained in physical terms, because at first 
sight humans clearly possess two distinct kinds of properties. Physical properties, such as 
weight, size or colour, are properties that natural sciences attribute to various objects, while 
mental properties, such as being conscious of, being sad, being in pain or having a belief, are 
typically attributed only to humans (and some to certain animals). While physical properties 
are public, i.e. in principle observable by anyone, mental properties are private to the subject 
that possesses them. For example, I can feel my pain, while everybody else can only infer 
from my behaviour that I am in pain, but cannot feel it themselves. 
Physicalists insist that this difference is only apparent and that mental phenomena can be 
explained in physical terms, but there are many strategies of how to achieve this. One 
physicalist view – quite popular in the 1960s – is the mind-brain identity theory which maintains 
that mental states are identical to brain states, by which they mean a true identity, not merely 
a correlation [1-3]. For example, identity theorists claim that an experience of pain is merely a 
brain process. In 1970 S. Kripke presented a modal argument against the mind-brain identity 
theories, which was a direct consequence of his views on proper names and natural kind terms [4]. 
Mind-brain identity theorists as well as Kripke in his model argument use pain as an example. 
In the decades since their debate took place, pain science has progressed considerably. 
Therefore, it is worth looking into whether this improved scientific understanding of the 
nature of pain has any bearing on Kripke’s modal argument. I am building on my talk at the 
19
th
 International multiconference – IS 2016 [5], in which I outlined my findings. Here I 
provide a more detailed account and argue that this analysis also reveals a major flaw that is 
common to every modal argument against physicalism, for example, David Chalmers’ zombie 
argument against physicalism. 
KRIPKE’S MODAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE MIND-BRAIN 
IDENTITY THEORY 
The identity theory holds that mental states and processes are identical to brain states and 
processes. Accordingly, there is only one state – the brain state, but it seems to us there are 
two distinct states, apart from the brain, there is also the mental state, because these identities 
are not necessary, but contingent. This means that we need to find out that a particular 
identity holds, or more specifically, it is the task of science to discover them, which is the 
reason why it appears that there are two distinct states and not only one. 
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At the time it was typical to understand necessity linguistically: a sentence is necessary if its 
truth is determined solely based on the meaning of the words it contains. For example, a 
sentence ‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ is necessarily true, because the meaning of the word 
‘bachelor’ is ‘an unmarried man’. Accordingly, in the case of necessary identities, their truth 
is known a priori, one only needs to know the meanings of the relevant words. However, in 
the case of contingent identities, their truth cannot be ascertained from linguistic meanings, 
but only discovered a posteriori. For example, the truth of the sentence ‘Lightning is a 
motion of electric charges’ cannot be determined based on meanings, since ‘lightning’ does 
not mean the same as ‘motion of electric charges’. The fact that the perceived lightning is a 
motion of electric charges was discovered by scientists based on theory and experiments. 
Consequently, the way we talk suggests we are dealing with two distinct things, but science 
tells us it is one and the same thing we refer to with two distinct words. And the same applies 
to the case of mental states. ‘Having a pain’ does not mean the same as ‘C-fibres firing’, but 
scientific findings tell us otherwise. The apparent difference is therefore the consequence of 
words having different meaning, but nonetheless both refer, in fact, to the same thing. 
The contingent nature of identity statements also makes it possible to maintain that in some 
other circumstances a mental state could be identified with some other physical state. In this 
way, Lewis, who defines the concept of pain as the concept of a state that occupies a certain 
causal role, can claim that, in the case of human pain, this state is that of C-fibres firing, 
while in the case of Martian pain, it is some other state, which occupies the relevant causal 
role [6; p.124]. 
But Kripke forcefully rejects the idea of contingent identities. His famous example is about 
the identity statements involving proper names, which are according to him rigid designators. 
That means that a name in every possible world designates the same object. Take the example 
of Hesperus and Phosphorus. Ancients named the brightest star in the evening Hesperus and 
the brightest star in the morning Phosphorus, but they later discovered that they are actually 
one and the same celestial body, namely Venus. Accordingly, the identity statement ‘Hesperus 
is Phosphorus’ is true. But since this identity was discovered by Babylonian astronomers 
empirically, it is an a posteriori truth. However, it is not contingent, as identity theorists 
would have it. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are names that refer in this world and consequently 
in every possible world to planet Venus. Therefore, identity statements between two names, 
when true at all, are necessarily true. And if they are false, they are necessarily false. 
Kripke uses the same strategy in the discussion on names of natural kinds, by which he 
means terms for natural kinds of stuff, such as water and gold, terms for natural kinds of 
things, such as the tiger, and for terms for natural phenomena, such as heat or lightning. 
These terms are rigid designators, too. Accordingly, they designate the same kind in every 
possible world. Relevant for this discussion is his treatment of theoretical identifications, 
such as ‘Lightning is a motion of electric charges’ and ‘Water is H2O’. Such identity 
statements are, as in the case of proper names, if true, necessarily true, and if false, 
necessarily false. 
However, these identifications are not known a priori since, for example, it is not part of the 
meaning of ‘water’ that water is composed of H2O. Originally, we identified water, or fixed 
the term’s reference, by its manifest properties, such as its characteristic feel, appearance, and 
so forth. As Kripke says, we identified it with the help of its contingent properties. But later 
scientists discovered water’s chemical composition, thus discovering its essential property. 
Now, while in some other possible world water will lack all manifest properties we initially 
identified it by, there will be no possible world in which water is not composed of H2O. 
Scientists discovered water’s essence and therefore ‘Water is H2O’ expresses an a posteriori 
necessary truth. 
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The same is true of the ‘Lightning is a motion of electric charges’. If it is in fact true that 
lightning is a motion of electric charges, then it is necessarily true. In general, theoretical 
identifications are necessary, if true at all, and science is discovering the true essences of 
natural phenomena, substances and species. 
If Kripke’s analysis is correct, then identity theorists cannot claim that pain is contingently 
identical with C-fibres firing, and the only path open to them is to maintain that the identity is 
necessary. But Kripke further argues that the identity theorists in the case of mental-physical 
identities cannot explain away the apparent contingency as it is the case with other theoretical 
identifications. This is, according to him, proof that they are not really identities, and concludes 
that mind-brain identity theories are false. Let us look at his argument a bit more closely. 
Identity theorists differentiate between at least two kinds of identifications, namely between 
two particular states and two types of states. In the first case we speak of token–token identity 
and in the second case of type–type identity. Suppose that I am having a pain in my right 
shoulder at this moment. A token–token identity theorist would maintain that this particular 
sensation of pain I am experiencing is identical to a particular physical state occurring inside 
me, while a type–type theorist would make a more general claim, proclaiming the identity 
between the two state-types, namely between a mental state of having pain and a physical 
state of C-fibres firing. Kripke considers both versions, but he mainly focuses on the type–type 
identity theses, since they best correspond with the theoretical identifications discussed 
previously in the text. 
While these identifications are necessary, the fact that they are knowable only a posteriori 
gives them an appearance of contingency. One way to explain this illusion is by noting that 
we usually fix the reference of the term by some contingent marks of the object or 
phenomenon. In the case of water, we proclaim that water is transparent, an odourless liquid 
found in rivers and lakes around here which quenches thirst. Since nowhere in this definition 
its chemical composition is mentioned, it is easy to come to the wrong conclusion that water 
could have been composed, say, of XYZ. This explains why necessary a posteriori truths on 
the surface appear to us contingent. Only when we note that they express identities of objects 
(‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are both names of planet Venus), the very nature of substances 
(water is composed of H2O) or phenomena (lightning is a motion of electric charges), do we 
realize that they are necessary and that it is not the case that Hesperus could not have been 
Phosphorus, water could not have been composed of H2O, and lightning could not have been 
a motion of electric charges. 
The type-type identity theorist, on the other hand, cannot in such a way dispel the supposed 
illusion of contingency. In the case of the identity of pain with C-fibre stimulation, we would 
need to show that the reference of pain is fixed by some of its accidental properties, which 
makes it possible for us to miss the fact that it is essentially C-fibre stimulation. This would 
explain why we are at first prepared to agree that pain could have been something else than 
C-fibre stimulation, but then we think better of it after we are informed that the true nature of 
pain is C-fibre stimulation. However, Kripke continues, pain ‘is not picked out by one of its 
accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its 
immediate phenomenological quality [4; p. 152]. Pain is picked out by its essential property, 
by its phenomenal feel, which fixes the referent of ‘pain’ as well as pain itself. There is no 
intermediary as in the case of ‘Heat is molecular motion’, where the sensation of heat is an 
intermediary between the external phenomenon and the observer. From this it follows that the 
appearance of contingency cannot be dispelled because it is not a mere appearance. 
Therefore, if we can imagine a situation in which pain is being felt without a stimulation of 
C-fibres, or a situation in which a stimulation of C-fibres exists without being felt as pain, 
then we must conclude that pain and C-fibre stimulation are two distinct things and that the 
identity thesis should be rejected. Pain is not identical to C-fibre stimulation. 
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In this short presentation of Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-brain identity theory I 
left out many details and I did not question any of his claims since my aim here is not to 
assess the strength of the argument as it is, but rather to determine whether a better scientific 
understanding of pain has any bearing on the argument. 
RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS ON PAIN 
Traditionally it was thought that pain is an injury-produced response. In the so-called 
specificity theory of pain, first, injury or some other somatic pathology activates pain 
receptors, and then the message is conveyed via specialized fibres directly up the spinal cord 
to the pain centre in the brain. 
As Aydede notes [7; p.31], it became clear by the 1960s that observed facts about pain could 
not be accounted for on the basis of such a simplistic theory. One problem was the high 
variability in the connection between nociceptive stimuli and the pain experience. For 
example, the same stimuli can elicit pain of widely different quality and intensity in different 
people as well as in the same person at different times. Another unexplainable data came 
from the dissociation effects, which were exhibited, for example, by patients who underwent 
prefrontal lobotomy, or cingulotomy. These patients reported that they were in pain; they 
could recognize its location, intensity and so on, but they were not bothered by it and did not 
behave like people normally do when in pain. In other words, the unpleasantness of pain was 
removed or reduced, while its sensory-discriminative aspect remained intact. Pain asymbolia 
presents an especially strong kind of dissociation, since patients do not react even to 
momentary pains like pinpricks, cuts or burns, and do not find any of it not in the least bit 
unpleasant. This suggests that phenomenological components of pain experience can come 
apart, which is difficult to explain when pain is connected with a simple, straightforward 
transmission from the place of injury to the brain. 
The high variability problem was solved in 1965 when Melzack and Wall proposed the 
gate-control theory [8]. According to it, noxious stimuli from the peripheral nociceptors are 
carried to the spinal cord through two types of fibres, faster (A-delta fibres) and slower 
(C-fibres), while the amount of nerve-impulse transmission from the periphery to the spinal 
cord transmission cells is controlled by the modulatory gating mechanism, which results in 
modulated output being transmitted to higher brain structures. Further research revealed the 
complexity of modulatory mechanisms and the important role that the brain plays in this 
activity through the descending pain-control pathways. All this explains the high variability 
in the link between the stimulus and the pain experience. And in 1968 also data gathered 
from the disassociation effects was accommodated within the gate-control theory when 
Melzack and Casey postulated multiple parallel central processing systems, which are 
selectively associated with the sensory-discriminative and motivational-affective aspect of 
pain experience [9]. Later research confirmed their hypothesis that functionally distinct central 
systems correspond to phenomenologically distinct and apparently dissociable components of 
pain experience. At least one other such component is a cognitive-evaluative one. 
In this new model, pain is allowed to be a subjective experience and is no longer explained in 
terms of behavioural responses to noxious stimuli. And the key role in this model is given to 
the brain which, as Melzack nicely puts it, creatively transforms ‘patterns of nerve impulses 
into the perceptual qualities, emotions, and meanings that compose the stream of subjective 
experience’ [10; p.3]. 
The new, more complex understanding of pain is also captured in the definition of The 
International Association for the Study of Pain according to which pain is ‘[a]n unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or 
described in terms of such damage’ [11]. 
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On the one hand, pain is a sensory experience since it is a sensation in a part or parts of the 
body, namely we perceive a tissue damage or potentially damaging condition. But on the 
other hand it is also an emotional experience since it is always unpleasant. Pain scientists go 
on to point out that they do not want to tie pain to the stimulus. As they say, ‘activity induced 
in the nociceptor and nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is not pain, which is always 
a psychological state, even though we may well appreciate that pain most often has a 
proximate physical cause’ [11]. 
The emphasis is therefore on the subjectivity of experience and not on its supposed physical 
causes. Moreover, the experience is recognized to be multidimensional. Scientists recognize 
sensory, motivational (affective) as well as cognitive components of pain experience. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR KRIPKE’S MODAL ARGUMENT 
In general, philosophers talking about the mind-body problem and using pain as an example, 
tend to mention C-fibres as a physical mechanism that ‘accompanies’ the subjective 
experience of pain. As we know, C-fibres are not the only fibres that respond to noxious 
stimuli, and there are many other mechanisms that participate in the processing of noxious 
stimuli. However, the mind-brain identity theory was popular in the 1950s and 1960s when 
pain researchers only started to discover the complexity of ‘pain’ mechanisms, so it would be 
unreasonable to expect a more detailed explanation of relevant mechanisms. Still, it seems a 
bit funny that the mind-brain identity theorists proclaim mental states to be identical with 
brain states, but then identify pain with C-fibres which are not even part of the brain. 
Many find this simplistic talk of philosophers of mind offensive to science. For example, 
Nikola Grahek in his book [12], which mainly focuses on pain asymbolia and what lessons 
we can learn from the complete dissociation of the sensory-discriminative dimension of pain 
from its other components, finds philosophers’ treatment of C-fibres appalling. He claims that 
they were first uncritically introduced, with complete disregard for their distinctive 
properties, and then uncritically rejected. Probably he has identity theorists in mind when he 
further complains that ‘[s]ome philosophers have “located” these quasi-mythical peripheral 
afferent fibers in the brain (!)’ [12, p.142]. 
In my opinion, Grahek and other critics are too harsh on philosophers of mind here. They are 
not being condescending to science, but rather trying to give it space to do its job. 
Accordingly, as Aydede nicely puts it, the role of C-fibres is to be ‘a sort of stand-in or proxy 
for whatever the ultimate physical structure is to be identified with pain experience (in case 
the Identity Theory is your game) or for whatever it is that turns out to be the occupant of the 
functional role of pains (if Functionalism is your preferred game)’ [13]. While I accept this 
well-intentioned interpretation of philosophers’ references to scientific findings, I do not find 
it harmless. If you have scant knowledge of the physical, you are not really in a position to 
claim that the mental is nothing above this physical, or the opposite – that the mental is an 
extra ingredient of our world that cannot be explained in physical terms. It would be prudent 
to stick to easier questions and not jump head first into the mind-body problem. 
Better scientific understanding was surely at least in part responsible for the demise of the 
mind-brain identity theories and the advance of functionalism. But the focus of this paper are 
not the merits of the mind-brain identity theories, but the question how a better scientific 
understanding of pain bears on Kripke’s modal argument against these theories, and the 
possible implications for the modal arguments against physicalism in general. 
Kripke bases his criticism on his analysis of theoretical identifications, such as ‘Water is 
H2O’, according to which such claims are necessary, if true. At first glance they seem 
contingent though, for instance, that water could have been something other than H2O. This 
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appearance of contingency is explained by the fact that the reference of ‘water’ is fixed by 
water’s manifest properties, which are its accidental properties, and not by its essential 
property of being H2O. The true nature of water is discovered empirically and does not 
feature in our aprioristic conceptual schemes. And here Kripke locates a problem for the 
mind-brain identity theorists and their identity claims – they cannot explain away the 
apparent contingency in such a way. In the case of the identity between experience of pain 
and C-fibre stimulation, we cannot say that it just seems to us that these two things are not 
identical because we pick out pain by its contingent experience, but it turns out, or it is a 
scientific discovery, that its true nature is C-fibre stimulation. We cannot say this because, 
according to Kripke, pain is picked out by its essential property, by what makes it pain – 
namely, by its characteristic phenomenal quality. Consequently, pain and C-fibre stimulation 
are two distinct things and not one. 
However, Kripke starts from the assumption that the sensation of pain is a simple experience, 
but we now know that it is, in fact, complex and has at least three components: sensory-
discriminative, motivational-affective and cognitive. Now the brain-identity theorists can face 
Kripke’s challenge and explain the apparent contingency of otherwise necessary identity 
between pain experience and C-fibre stimulation. Let me point out that what I describe here is 
not my view on pain. I do not claim it is a plausible one, my only aim here being to show one 
way in which Kripke’s modal argument can be rejected. 
The challenge is the following. We should be able to imagine a situation in which pain is 
being felt without a stimulation of C-fibres and a situation in which a stimulation of C-fibres 
exists without being felt as pain. The general strategy would be to claim that not all 
components identified in pain experiences are essential to it. I will take here into 
consideration only the sensory-discriminative and the motivational-affective components. 
One option would be to claim that we pick out pain by its affective character, namely its 
unpleasantness, which is actually only a contingent property of pain. Let’s suppose scientists 
found out that its true nature is being C-fibre stimulation. Then, one could imagine a situation 
in which someone experiences unpleasantness without C-fibre stimulation and mistakenly 
thinks this is pain. But it is not, since pain is C-fibre stimulation essentially. The same way 
one could imagine a situation in which some of hers C-fibres are stimulated, but she does not 
experience any unpleasantness, and, accordingly, no pain. Again, this would be wrong 
impression since C-fibre stimulation is essential to pain, while unpleasantness is only 
accidental property. 
The last situation is actually not only imagined, but is pretty accurate description of a 
situation in which patients suffering from pain asymbolia are in. They proclaim to feel pain, 
they are able to localize it, to determine its intensity and qualitative character, yet they are 
simply not bothered by it and do not exhibit any typical pain behaviour. They do not find it 
unpleasant [12, 14]. Nonetheless, one difference from the imagined situation is that they do 
not say they are not in pain because they do not experience unpleasantness, which could 
suggest that maybe sensory-discriminative component is essential to pain. Or maybe it 
suffices for pain that at least one of the two is present? These are interesting questions that I 
will leave for another occasion. 
Now, Kripke could propose the following improvement of his argument. The experience of 
pain is not a simple experience, but a complex one, and we are not entirely sure which 
component, if not perhaps all of them, are essential for something to count as pain. 
Nevertheless, it is still the case that its phenomenal character is essential to pain, whether it is 
its sensory-descriptive or its motivational-affective component, or both. Without the 
experience of pain there is no pain. Therefore, one can still imagine a situation in which they 
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do not experience (any component of) pain, but some of their C-fibres are stimulated. 
Contingency is not only apparent, but true, and pain is not identical to C-fibre stimulation (or 
whatever other physical structure). 
Kripke is right that subjective experiences are special and that we cannot write them off as 
accidental properties of a certain physical phenomenon as it is the case with heat and 
lightning, where the sensation of heat or our perception of lightning is just a way in which we 
pick out the respective phenomenon, and not its essential part. However, part of his modal 
argument is the claim that we know very well what the nature of pain is, so we are 
trustworthy when we claim that we can imagine a situation in which we are not experiencing 
pain, but our C-fibres are stimulated. But it turned out that we do not know the nature of pain 
so well after all, so maybe we are not very good in imagining situations involving pain either. 
Maybe pain is identical to some physical structure after all, we just do not know it. 
Let me illustrate my point with the example of water. Before scientists discovered that water 
is H2O, one could imagine its internal structure to be many different things. Its true nature 
was simply not known, so it was impossible to make certain claims about what is possible for 
water and what is not. But in the case of pain, we are still in such a position, so our possibility 
claims concerning pain are unwarranted. The fact that we can imagine a situation in which pain 
is present without C-fibre stimulation can be also attributed to our ignorance of the true nature 
of pain. Maybe what we are imagining is not a portrayal of a possible situation at all. Moreover, 
if the way pain feels like is essential to pain, this does not mean that C-fibre stimulation 
cannot be essential as well. Both could be essential to pain, one does not exclude the other. 
To conclude, at this point in pain research we simply do not know yet whether it can be 
explained solely in physical terms or not. And if we accept Kripke’s claim that science 
discovers essences of natural phenomena, then we should let it do its job and not assume we 
can decide this question beforehand solely relying on our powers of imagination. The modal 
argument cannot help us decide this matter one way or the other. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM 
Kripke’s modal argument is not the only such argument in the philosophy of mind. Another 
famous example is Chalmers’ zombie argument [15, 16]. Chalmers basically argues that since 
we can conceive a zombie – a complete physical duplicate of a normal human being who 
behaves and functions exactly like that human being, but lacks all conscious experience – 
such a creature is metaphysically possible, which in turn implies that physicalism is false. 
Consciousness is some extra ingredient in the world that cannot be explained in physical terms. 
While this argument does not involve pain specifically, the lesson of a better understanding 
of pain also applies to it and to all other modal arguments against physicalism. In matters in 
which we still lack relevant scientific information, imaginability or conceivability cannot play 
a decisive role. Our claims of what is possible concerning the mental, the physical and their 
relationship are unwarranted until we acquire a better scientific understanding of our physical 
structure, functioning of various mechanisms, but also of the nature of subjective experience. 
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